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Abstract
In this paper, we study the so-called minimum income condition order, which is
used in some day-ahead electricity power exchanges to represent the production-
related costs of generating units. This order belongs to the family of complex
orders, which introduce non-convexities in the market clearing problem. We
demonstrate via simple numerical examples that if more of such bids are present
in the market, their interplay may open the possibility of strategic bidding.
More precisely, we show that by the manipulation of bid parameters, a strategic
player may increase its own profit and potentially induce the deactivation of an
other minimum income condition order, which would be accepted under truthful
bidding. Furthermore, we show that if we modify the objective function used
in the market clearing according to principles suggested in the literature, it is
possible to prevent the possibility of such strategic bidding, but the modification
raises other issues.
Keywords: Day-ahead electricity markets, minimum income condition orders,
complex orders, incentive compatibility, strategic bidding
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1. Introduction
If one investigates trading and pricing mechanisms in various electricity
markets around the globe, it may be recognized that despite local market in-
tegration advancements and the convergence implied by them, the evolution
of individual markets resulted in a diverse set of mechanisms and approaches
(Oksanen et al., 2009; Sioshansi, 2011). Moreover, additional allocation and
pricing mechanisms emerged in relation with electricity trade, as balancing mar-
kets (Singh and Papalexopoulos, 1999) and transmission-related allocation and
pricing (Pan et al., 2000).
The paper (Imran and Kockar, 2014) summarizes the various aspects of dif-
ferences between North American and European type market designs. One of
these aspects is the format of generator hourly bids in the day-ahead market.
While in the typical US market model cost-based multi-part bids containing
fuel cost, no load cost and start-up cost are submitted, the European design is
fundamentally based on price-based single-part bids containing price and energy
volume. In this paper we focus on generator bids in European-type portfolio-
bidding markets, or day-ahead power exchanges (DAPXs). These markets are
cleared in order to obtain zonal market clearing prices (in contrast to US type
market designs, where locational marginal pricing is applied). In the general
framework these markets are coupled, and the clearing mechanisms also take
transmission constraints into account (Chatzigiannis et al., 2016; Biskas et al.,
2013a,b).
1.1. Simple hourly bids in DAPXs
The fundamental setting of these two-sided multiunit markets is very simple:
Participants on the supply and the demand side submit bids characterized by
quantity (q) and price per unit (p) for the respective trading period(s) (typi-
cally hour) of the following day, which in general may be fully or also partially
accepted, according to the resulting market clearing price (MCP) of each hour.
In this basic setup, we practically look for the intersection point of demand and
supply curves, which ensures the balance of consumption and production. This
way, in each period maximum one bid is partially accepted, which determines
the MCP.
Figure 1 shows a simple example of such a market clearing for a single-period,
single-zone case. We assume 3-3 bids on the supply and demand side denoted
by S1-S3 and D1-D3 respectively. The supply and demand curves depict bids
sorted by their price (in increasing/decreasing order).
The bid quantity of bid i of type w (w ∈ {s, d}) is denoted by qwi , while
its price is denoted by pwi . Demand bids are considered with negative quantity
(qdi < 0). Cumulative quantities, defining the breakpoints of the supply and















In this particular case, D2 (the second demand bid) is partially accepted,













stand for the cumulative quantities.
We solved this simple case by determining the intersection point of the supply
and the demand curves. As we will see in the next subsection (1.2), special bids
in these markets may be present, which do not allow partial acceptance. In this
case, the curve-intersection approach may fail, if the intersection point hits one
of these bids.
However, the intersection point on Figure 1 has an other important inter-
pretation. Let us define acceptance values for each bid: ywi ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
acceptance ratio of bid i of type w (w ∈ {s, d}). The acceptance values which
determine the intersection point in this case are
ys1 = 1 y
s
2 = 1 y
s
3 = 0 y
d
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i = 0 . (3)
Let us furthermore define the concept of the total social welfare (TSW).
TSW in this context is interpreted as the total utility of consumption, minus

















(Remember that qdi < 0.)
This quantity equals to the area between the accepted part of the demand
and supply curves. It is easy to see that if we start from the point defined by
the values (2) and decrease or increase the total traded quantity (the supply-
demand balance must still hold), the TSW is strictly decreased. In fact, the
values described in (2) are exactly those values, which maximize the total social
welfare of the market, assuming the balance constraint 3.
This concept of TSW maximization may be generalized to more complex
cases. Indeed, this principle is usually a fundamental element of European-type
market clearing mechanisms.
In general, if multiple trading periods are considered and no interdependen-
cies arise between the periods, the above approach may be applied for each of the
periods independently. In this paper, we will assume a simple two-period case,
but as we will see in the following, the characteristic order types of electricity
trade will define interdependencies between the periods.
1.2. Complex orders in electricity markets
It is easy to see that the setup detailed above does not consider technological
constraints of generating units: It is possible that the resulting MCPs imply that
a unit submitting bids for two consecutive hours must produce at full capacity in
the first hour and shut down in the second (if its bid is fully accepted in the first
period, and fully rejected in the second), while the technological constraints of
the unit make this impossible. The first approach to address these problems has
been the introduction of so-called block orders (Meeus et al., 2009), which con-
nect multiple bids submitted for various periods and they must be fully accepted
or rejected in all of the respective periods (in other words, they are character-
ized by the ’fill-or-kill ’ condition). These bids imply non-convexities (integer
variables) in the market clearing problem (Madani et al., 2016), making the effi-
cient clearing of large scale markets challenging (Madani and Van Vyve, 2018).
To guarantee the existence of MCP when block orders are allowed, we must al-
low their deactivation, regardless of their bid prices (Madani, 2017). This may
result in so-called paradoxically rejected block orders (Madani and Van Vyve,
2014), the rejection of which seemingly contradicts to the resulting market
clearing prices (but in fact, they can not be accepted without the violation
of other constraints, since if they get accepted the MCP will not exist anymore
(Madani et al., 2016)).
Block orders are also beneficial for incorporating the non-negligible start-up
cost of the generating units. The simple cost model of generating units usu-
ally includes a fixed term (FT) corresponding to start-up costs and a variable
term (VT), which is interpreted as the linear coefficient describing the connec-
tion between the generated quantity and the variable (fuel) cost of the units
(see e.g. Richstein et al. (2018)). The efficient implementation and market ef-
fects of block orders have been discussed in the literature (Meeus et al., 2009;
Madani and Van Vyve, 2014, 2015).
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1.2.1. Minimum income condition orders
In addition to block orders, one may find further so-called complex orders
and products in today’s practical electricity market implementations (Sleisz and Raisz,
2016; Dourbois and Biskas, 2015; Van Vyve et al., 2011; Chatzigiannis et al.,
2016). One of these complex orders is the so-called Minimum Income Con-
dition (MIC) order. The MIC was first introduced in the Spanish electric-
ity market (Contreras et al., 2001) and since then it became quite commonly
used in various market models (Garcia-Bertrand et al., 2006; Lam et al., 2018;
Dourbois and Biskas, 2015, 2017; Operator, 2013; NL2, 2016), including novel
approaches which aim to provide optimization-based framework for the optimal
joint energy and reserves market clearing Koltsaklis and Dagoumas (2018).
Nevertheless, the necessity (Poli and Marracci, 2011), the effects on mar-
ket outcomes (Ruiz et al., 2012; Madani et al., 2016; Gil et al., 2017) and the
efficient implementation of MIC orders (Polgári et al., 2015; Sleisz et al., 2015;
Sleisz and Raisz, 2015; Madani and Van Vyve, 2018; Sleisz et al., 2019) are still
subject to ongoing debates and studies.
EUPHEMIA, the market-coupling tool which was brought to life by Euro-
pean market integration trends, and serves as a kind of reference for European
market design approaches, also includes MIC orders. In its public description
(Commitee, 2019), Minimum Income Condition (MIC) orders are defined as
supply orders consisting of several hourly step bids (elementary bids) for poten-
tially different market hours, which are connected by the MIC which prescribes
that the overall income of the MIC order must cover its given costs. These costs
are defined by a fix term (representing the startup cost of a power plant) and a
variable term multiplied by the total assigned production volume (representing
the operation cost per MWh of a power plant). Formally, the Minimum Income
Condition constraint is defined by two parameters:
• A fix term (FT) in Euros
• A variable term (VT) in Euros per accepted MWh.
In the final solution, MIC orders may be activated or deactivated (as a
whole):
• In case a MIC order is activated, each of the hourly sub-orders of the MIC
behaves like any other hourly order, which means that they are accepted
if and only if the MCP is higher or equal to the bid price.
• In case a MIC order is deactivated, each of the hourly sub-orders of the
MIC is fully rejected, even the MCP is higher or equal to the bid price.
We can see that the MIC condition links multiple hourly bids, and the nec-
essary condition for the acceptance of these bids is the activation of the MIC
order, which can be described by a binary variable.
1.3. Incentive-compatibility and its relevance in electricity-related markets
The concept of incentive-compatibility is originating from the 70’s (Hurwicz,
1973; Groves and Ledyard, 1987), and it is related to the evaluation of allocation
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mechanisms under the assumption of strategic behavior of participants. The
topic is discussed in auction theory (Klemperer, 2004), however most of the
results in this field correspond to single-unit auctions of indivisible goods (Roth,
1982), while in the case of electricity markets a multi-unit auction framework
applies. Let us however note that the problem of simultaneous allocation of
multiple indivisible goods with complementarities is addressed in the framework
of combinatorial auctions (De Vries and Vohra, 2003; Cramton et al., 2007).
As formulated by Nisan et al. (2007), ’A mechanism is called incentive-
compatible if every participant can achieve the best outcome to themselves just
by acting according to their true preferences ’. As the original problem state-
ment assumes indivisible goods, which does not hold in multi-unit electricity
auctions, preferences translate to evaluations in our case: Considering the sim-
ple example depicted in Fig. 1, in ideal case, bidders on the demand side bid
their real consumption utilities and bidders on the supply side bid their real
marginal costs. We consider strategic bidding compared to this reference case
of truthful bidding.
Figure 2: Possible small variations of the bid price of supply bid 1 (∆) has no effect on the
MCP, thus the acceptance and payoff supply bid 1 is not affected.
Figure 2 demonstrates, why the standard, marginal clearing model (i.e. MCP
based model) of multi-unit electricity markets is considered to be practically
incentive-compatible.
If we perturb the bid price of supply bid 1 (S1) by ∆ as depicted in the
picture, the outcome of the auction does not change: The MCP determining
the set of accepted/rejected bids will be the same as before. In addition, as bids
are paid off according to the MCP, the resulting utility of the deviating player
also remains the same. If e.g. the bid price is increased, the nominal income of
the bid is increased, but the surplus resulting from the difference of the MCP
and the bid price is decreased by the same amount.
6
The above deduction is on the one hand only true for small deviations (e.g.





holds) and on the other hand it is not true for all bids. As in the proposed case
the second demand bid (D2) sets the MCP, pd
2
is in fact affecting the market
clearing price, and if the bidder of D2 decreases pd2, it can effectively increase





If we consider an other bid than D2, but perturb the price so much that it
changes the ordering of bids, and the actual bid will be exactly the price-setter








), the same effect arises.
In practice, the number of standard bids for any period in DAPXs is high
(several thousand or tens of thousands), and as in the bid submission process
the actual other bids are not known, at first glance it seems unlikely that such
manipulation can be effectively carried out. On the other hand, as recent ex-
amples have shown (Moylan, 2014), the number of big players may be limited,
and high proportion of bids may originate from the same players. In this case,
oligopolistic behavior and related phenomena may emerge on electricity markets
(David and Wen, 2001).
Regarding MIC orders, according to the publicly available data of OMIE (the
Spanish DAPX), where this formulation is used1, the number of these orders is
significantly lower, about 75-85 per day.
In the above reasoning, we assumed the manipulation of bid price. This
is however not the only alternative. Let us assume a market scenario, where
there are some large suppliers with significant bid quantities, like S2 in Fig.
1. As depicted in Fig. 3, if qs
2





point of the two curves will change, the MCP is increased, and the bidder of
S2 receives significantly more payoff for one unit of energy. This phenomena is
also termed as capacity withholding, discussed by Esmaeili Aliabadi (2016) in a
similar auction-based but also network-constrained framework. The possibility
also arises on the other side (demand reduction), although in electricity markets,
large producers (i.e. big power plants) are more prevalent than large consumers.
While in this very case the supply is reduced in the market, in order to get
a higher payoff, similar effects may arise if multiple participants are competing
for a fixed set of goods, as in the case of treasury and spectrum auctions. In
this case, as discussed by Ausubel and Cramton (2002), we talk about demand
reduction.
Up to this point we discussed cases in which one participant unilaterally
changes its bidding behavior to improve its payoff, while it was assumed that
the rest of the bids is unchanged. The question however may be formulated in
a more general context as well, where all submitted bids are subject to strategic
behavior. The paper of Aliabadi et al. (2016) considers power generation com-
panies (GenCos) located in a network as leaders of a Stackelberg type game,
in which the independent system operator (ISO) plays the role of the follower.
The paper develops a bi-level mathematical programming framework to model
1https://www.omie.es
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Figure 3: Reduction of supply: The quantity of the bid S2 is modified to the half of its original
value. This causes the MCP to increase.
the market clearing mechanism of the ISO where the behavior of GenCos and
network constraints are taken into account. In this model, the authors are able
to describe the collusive behavior of GenCos, and also provide numerical exam-
ples demonstrating the possible uniqueness/non uniqueness of Nash Equilibria.
As we will see later, our main aim in this paper is to show how the minimum
income condition orders may be used for strategic bidding. Potential equilib-
rium problems resulting from such strategic behavior are not the main focus of
this study, they are discussed only marginally.
1.3.1. Pay-as-bid auction and incentive-compatibility
Let us note that in addition to the marginal clearing model described in sub-
section 1.1, the pay-as-bid method is also applies in the case of some electricity
related markets, like for example the Iranian electricity market2. However, as
discussed by Tierney et al. (2008), in this case, in contrast to the marginal
clearing market model, all participants do have clear incentives: Suppliers aim
to raise their bid prices up to the maximum acceptable level to earn the most
payoff. This results in a flattened supply curve, and according to Tierney et al.
(2008), it exacerbates market competitiveness.
In other studies, agent based simulations were used to determine optimal
strategic bidding behavior and market efficiency in the context of pay as bid vs
marginal pricing (Xiong et al., 2004; Bakirtzis and Tellidou, 2006; Bower and Bunn,
2001; Liu et al., 2012; Aliabadi et al., 2017).
2http://www.irema.ir/trading/day-ahead-market
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1.4. Contribution and structure of the paper
The possibilities of strategic bidding via MIC orders have not been explicitly
discussed in the literature. In this paper, our aim is to show that under the
current practice, bidders submitting MIC bids may have additional incentives
for strategic bidding, if multiple such bids are present on the actual market.
To demonstrate this, based on the widely used EUPHEMIA framework and
the respective definition and formalism of MIC orders, we introduce a simple
market clearing framework for a two period market, where the phenomenon may
be studied in its purest form.
In section 2, we introduce the computational implementation of the market
in detail. Section 3 demonstrates how strategic bidding may increase the payoff
of MIC bids via the interplay of such bids, and also analyses the scenario, when
a modification in the objective function of the market clearing algorithm is
introduced to address this issue. Section 4 evaluates and discusses the proposed
results, and finally section 5 concludes and drafts future prospects of the work.
2. Materials and Methods
In the next subsection, we introduce the market model in which the interplay
of MIC orders is studied. To clarify our terminology, MIC orders are composed
of multiple hourly bids (termed ’sub-orders’ in the EUPHEMIA description cited
in subsection 1.2), belonging to different trading periods (hours).
2.1. Computational implementation
The market clearing in DAPXs is implemented as an optimization problem.
In this section, we introduce the components (variables) of this problem and
formulate the corresponding constraints and the objective function.
We assume a simplified single-zone market model, where only two time pe-
riods are considered. In addition, we assume that only two types of bids are
present on the market:
• Simple hourly bids. The acceptance of these bids is solely determined
by the MCP of the respective period.
• Hourly bids belonging to complex MIC orders. The acceptance of
these bids depend not only on the MCP of the period to which the bid
belongs, but on the total income of the order, which, in turn, depends on
the MCP values of other periods as well.
Since MIC conditions of complex orders define interdependencies between
trading periods, the bids submitted for various periods must be cleared simul-
taneously.
The computational form of the market model used in this paper includes the
following variables:
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• Market clearing prices (MCPs) of the two trading periods, denoted by
MCP1 and MCP2 respectively. In the current paper we assume that
every MCP is nonnegative.
• Acceptance variables of simple hourly supply bids. The acceptance vari-
able of the i-th simple supply bid is denoted by ysi . All acceptance variables
are bounded as 0 ≤ y ≤ 1.
• Acceptance variables of simple hourly demand bids. The acceptance vari-
able of the i-th simple demand bid is denoted by ydi .
• Acceptance variables of hourly bids belonging to complex orders. The
acceptance variable corresponding to the i-th component of complex order
c is denoted by yci
• Variables corresponding to the income of individual bids of complex orders.
The income of bid yci is denoted by I
c
i .
• Auxiliary integer variables corresponding to the big-M implementations
of logical implications. The vector of these variables is denoted by z.
2.1.1. Simple hourly orders
The acceptance constraints in the case of simple hourly supply bids may be
written as
ysi > 0 ↔ p
s
i ≤ MCPt
ysi < 1 ↔ MCPt ≤ p
s
i (5)
where psi is the bid price of the simple hourly supply bid i, and MCPt denotes
the MCP of period t, for which the bid is submitted (t ∈ {1, 2}).
The implications may be easily included in the MILP formulation. Let us
consider e.g. the first implication of eq. 5, which is equivalent to
psi ≤ MCPt or y
s
i ≤ 0 . (6)
The equivalent of the logical expression (6) is the set of the inequalities (7),
where z ∈ {0, 1} is an auxiliary integer variable and MCP is the upper bound
of the variable MCP .
psi − zMCP t ≤ MCPt
ysi − (1 − z) ≤ 0 (7)
We can use the variable z to ’cancel’ one of the inequalities of 6, but not both of
them. In the following we assume that all implications are implemented using
the above ’bigM’ method (where the bigM refers to MCP the upper bound of
MCP used in the formulation).
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Similarly to supply bids, in the case of simple hourly demand bids, the
constraints may be written as
ydi > 0 ↔ MCPt ≤ p
d
i
ydi < 1 ↔ p
d
i ≤ MCPt, (8)
where pdi is the bid price of the simple hourly demand bid i.
2.1.2. Bids of complex orders
The first part of the constraints described in the formula (5) is also active
in the case of supply bids belonging to complex orders:
yci > 0 → p
c
i ≤ MCPt, (9)
where pci is the bid price of the i-th component of the complex order c, corre-
sponding to time period t.
The considerations of an MIC bid described in subsection 1.2 are formulated
in the optimization framework of market-clearing algorithms as
∑
i







where yk is the acceptance indicator of the elementary bid k belonging to set
of bids of the complex order c. FTc and V Tc denote the fixed and variable
cost terms of complex order c. qci is the bid quantity of bid y
c
i , and I
c is the






Intuitively Ici may be calculated as





where qci stands for the quantity of the bid y
c
i .
Equation (12) however includes a quadratic expression of variables, namely
the product ofMCPt and y
c
i , the implementation of which would result in a com-
putationally demanding quadratically constrained problem (MIQCP). To over-
come this issue, and obtain a linear form of expressions, following Sleisz and Raisz
(2015); Sleisz et al. (2019), we formulate the expressions for income as
























As described by Sleisz and Raisz (2015), taking into account the bid acceptance
rule described in (9), three possibilities may arise:
11
1. If the bid is entirely accepted (yci = 1), I
c
i equals the product of q
c
i and
MCPt according to (13).











(13) and (14) are active in this case and they result in the same inequality.
3. And finally, if the bid is entirely rejected (yci = 0), according to (14)
Ici = 0.
2.1.3. Power balance
Formula (15) describes that the quantity of accepted supply bids must be
equal the quantity of accepted demand bids for all periods. Let us note again









ydi = 0 ∀t (15)
where Bt denotes the set of bids corresponding to period t.
2.1.4. The objective function
Following the fundamental concepts of day-ahead electricity auctions (Madani,
2017), the objective function of the problem is to maximize the total social wel-























In other words, the TSW is the total utility of consumption minus the total
cost of production, in the context of the acceptance/rejection of hourly bids. As
qDi < 0 by definition for all i, the corresponding terms must be multiplied with
-1.
Let us note that this objective is in accordance with the concept used in
EUPHEMIA (Commitee, 2019), where a somewhat different terminology is used.
The EUPHEMIA description aims to maximize the sum of the consumer surplus
and the producer surplus, which is in fact the TSW. The consumer surplus (CS)


















i (MCPt − p
s
i ) (17)
If one considers a simple case without block bids, as depicted Fig. 1, the
TSW is the area between the demand and the supply curve, considering those
parts which are leftmost of the intersection point. The MCP divides this area
into two parts: The upper is CS, while the lower is PS (TSW = CS + PS).
The detailed formulation of the optimization problem of the market clearing




In this section, we introduce a simple example bid set in a 2-period example,
to demonstrate that due to the special interplay between MIC bids, partici-
pants may have incentives to bid false production cost. Let us assume the bids
described in Table 1.
ID t q p var
S1 1 2 5 ys
1
S2 1 2 6 ys2
S3 2 2 5 ys
3
S4 2 2 6 ys4
S5 1 2 1 yc1
1
S6 2 2 1 yc1
2
S7 1 2 4 yc21
S8 2 2 4 yc2
2
D1 1 -5 10 yd1
D2 2 -5 10 yd
2
Table 1: Hourly bids of example I: Parameters and corresponding variables.
We suppose that S5-S6 and S7-S8 are part of complex MIC orders (c1 and
c2 respectively), while the rest of the bids are standard bids, cleared purely
according to the resulting MCP.
Let us furthermore assume that the production cost parameters of the units
corresponding to c1 and c2 are described by the following parameters:
FT1 = 10 V T1 = 2
FT2 = 10 V T2 = 2 . (18)
We assume that the participant submitting the complex order c1 is the only
strategic player, and we call this participant player 1 in the following.
3.1. Case 1
In this case, we assume that player 1 submits its real production costs as
parameters of the complex order (i.e. submits the real FT1 and V T1 values, as
described in (18)). As player 2 is not considered as a strategic player in this
example, in the following we assume that FT2 and V T2 is always equal to the
values in (18). This case serves as the reference describing truthful bidding.
In this case, if we maximize the total social welfare based on the hourly
bids (as described in subsection 2.1 and as it is usual in the case of European
portfolio-bidding type markets), we get the following result. The MCP is 5 in
13









































































The total cost of MIC bid c1 is 18, while its total income is 20, thus the
MIC condition holds. The profit of the strategic player is 2 units in this case.
Similarly, the total cost of MIC bid c2 is 18, while its total income is also 20,
thus the MIC condition holds here as well. The resulting dispatch is depicted
in Fig. 4.
Figure 4: Resulting dispatch in case 1.
3.2. Case 2
In this case, we assume that the parameters of the hourly bids are the same
(as described in Table 1), while player 1 increases the submitted FT value from
14
10 to 14.
FT1 = 14 V T1 = 2
FT2 = 10 V T2 = 2 (21)
In this case, it is impossible to accept both c1 and c2. If we consider the
dispatch depicted in Fig. 4, which corresponds to the simultaneous acceptance
of c1 and c2, we can see that the total income of c1 is still 20, but the respective
total cost (according to the reported parameters) is 22 (14 units from the fixed
cost and 8 units from the variable cost), thus the market clearing algorithm will
not allow this outcome.
If we perform the optimization of the market clearing in this case, we get the
following results. The MCP is 6 in both periods, and regarding the standard










































































According to the submitted parameters, the total cost of MIC bid c1 is 22,
while its total income is 24, thus the MIC condition holds. Considering the real
parameters, the production cost of c1 is still 18, thus the real profit of player
1 is increased from 2 to 6 compared to the truthful bidding case described in
subsection 3.1. As no hourly bid of MIC order c2 is accepted, its cost is zero,
thus the corresponding MIC holds.
The resulting dispatch is depicted in Fig. 5 As the complex order c2 is
deactivated, its hourly bids (S7 and S8) are not included in the supply curve.
We can see that by increasing the FT value, player 1 has ’pushed out’ MIC
order S2, and increased its own profit. The reason behind this is the following:
The increase of FT1 would intuitively imply the rejection of c1, because its MIC
condition is not valid anymore. As the objective function (the TSW) is however
determined on the basis of the hourly bids, the solver does not want to ’loose’
the hourly bids S5 and S6 corresponding to c1, since, due to their low bid price,
they significantly contribute to the TSW. A more optimal solution is to drop
the bids S7 and S8 of c2. By the deactivation of the complex order c2, all
corresponding constraints are fulfilled, and c1 may remain active.
In this case, c2 is a paradoxically rejected MIC order in this case. If we
consider only the resulting MCPs, it seems that the hourly bids belonging to
15
Figure 5: Resulting dispatch in case 2.
c2 may be (fully) accepted, and its MIC may be fulfilled. This is however not
a feasible scenario, exactly as in the case of paradoxically rejected block orders
(Madani, 2017).
Let us note furthermore that any submitted FT value for c1 satisfying 12 <
FT1 ≤ 16 will do the job for player 1, in the sense that in any such case the
hourly bids of c1 will fully be accepted, while the order c2 will be deactivated.
The resulting MCP and thus the (real) profit of player 1 is independent of the
exact value of FT1 in this case (if 12 < FT1 ≤ 16). If FT1 ≤ 12, the MIC
condition will also be satisfied with the MCP of 5, thus the acceptance of c2 is
allowed, and if 16 < FT1, the MIC of c1 will not hold, thus it will be deactivated
and c2 will be accepted.
3.3. Modifying the objective function
As the anomaly discussed above originates from the fact that the objective
function is determined solely by the acceptance values and parameters of the
hourly bids, a quite straightforward approach to resolve such problem is the
modification of the objective function. In this case, the hourly bids correspond-
ing to complex orders are not considered in the objective function. Instead of
them, the cost of production in the case of complex orders is considered based on
the given price parameters corresponding to fixed and variable terms (FT and
VT). There are examples present in the literature, which follow a similar ap-
proach. Start-up costs are included in the objective function in (Gabriel et al.,
2013; Ruiz et al., 2012), and Madani and Van Vyve (2018) also consider the
start-up costs in the objective, however the formulation is different in this case.
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where yc ∈ {0, 1} equals to 1 if the complex order c is activated, FTc and V Tc
are the respectively the fixed and variable costs of complex bid c.
In the following, we will show that this modification of the objective function
resolves the possibility of strategic bidding described in subsection 3.2, but it
implies a different kind of issue.
3.3.1. Outcome of case 1 assuming the modified TSW
If we apply the modified TSW described in eq. (24) for the bid set described
in subsection 3.1, the results do not change. All the resulting acceptance indi-
cators, MCPs and payoffs are the same as in the original case.
3.3.2. Outcome of case 2 assuming the modified TSW
On the other hand, if the modified TSW described in eq. (24) is applied for
the bid set described in subsection 3.2, the results are affected. In this case, we









































































As no hourly bid of MIC order c1 is accepted, its cost is zero, thus the
corresponding MIC holds. The total cost of MIC order c2 is 18, while its total
income is 24, thus the MIC condition holds.
We can see that assuming this formulation, increasing FT does not work for
player 1, as it results in the deactivation of its bid, thus its profit is decreased
compared to the reference scenario (Case 1, with truthful bidding). At first
glance, it seems that the modification of the objective function resolved the
problem of the possibility of strategic bidding.
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3.3.3. Case 3
In this subsection, we show that if we assume the modified objective function
described by eq. (24), which omits the terms corresponding to the hourly bids of
MIC orders, and considers the cost of these bids based on FT and VT, another
potential problems may arise during the clearing process.
Let us assume that the true cost of units submitting complex orders is still
as described in subsection 3.1. We have seen in subsection 3.3.1 that in the case
of truthful bidding, the modified objective function (TSW) has no effect on the
outcome.
Let us now furthermore assume that player 1 modifies the bid price of the
hourly bids belonging to its complex order c1 from 1 to 5.5. We assume that all
other hourly bids remain unchanged, as summarized in Table 2.
ID t q p var
S1 1 2 5 ys
1
S2 1 2 6 ys
2
S3 2 2 5 ys3
S4 2 2 6 ys
4
S5 1 2 5.5 yc1
1
S6 2 2 5.5 yc12
S7 1 2 4 yc2
1
S8 2 2 4 yc22
D1 1 -5 10 yd
1
D2 2 -5 10 yd2
Table 2: Hourly bids of example I: Parameters and corresponding variables.
Furthermore, we suppose that regarding FT and VT, true values are sub-
mitted.
FT1 = 10 V T1 = 2
FT2 = 10 V T2 = 2 (27)
Let us first note that in this case it is impossible to accept both complex
bids. Fig 6 depicts the resulting dispatch in the case if both MICs are accepted.
As it can be seen, the bid acceptance constraints, which connect the bid
prices of hourly bids to the MCP result in the MCP of 5.5 for both periods,
implying that the hourly bids of c1 are partially accepted. In this case, the
total cost of the MIC order c1 is 10+4=14, while its income is 11, thus the MIC
condition does not hold. This shows that c1 and c2 can not be accepted in the
same time. Furthermore, it can be seen in Fig. 6, that any price for the hourly
bid between 5 and 6 will do the job: The implied MCP and thus the income of
c1 will be different, but even an MCP of 6 and the implied income of 12 will
not satisfy the MIC constraint (12<10+4).
Either c1 or c2 can be accepted, furthermore, as the hourly bids of complex
orders are not considered in the modified objective function (the modified TSW),
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Figure 6: Resulting dispatch if both MICs would be accepted.
and the parameters FT and V T are the same for c1 and c2, they result in the
same TSW. In both cases, according to eq. (24), the resulting TSW may be
calculated as the value of the accepted hourly demand bids (100), minus the
value of accepted hourly bids, which are not part of complex orders (S1 and
S3 are relevant, with the value of 20), minus the cost of MIC bids according to
equation 10, namely 10+4=14, resulting in the TSW value of 66, considering
either the acceptance of c1 or c2. In either case, the resulting dispatch will look
like the one depicted in Fig. 5, resulting in the MCP of 6, and implying an
income of 24 for the accepted MIC order (in contrast to the original 20, while
the cost is the same).
This means that the objective function has no unique maximum in this case.
In such scenarios, the outcome of the market clearing depends on the imple-
mentation of the optimization problem, and on the properties of the used solver
as well. In general it can be said, that if player 1 modifies its bid parameters
as in Table 2, it is possible that during the clearing c1 will be favoured, c2 will
be ’pushed out’ again, and the profit of c1 will be increased. More importantly,
the resulting optimization problem has no unique solution, and the outcome of
the market may depend on implementation details.
4. Discussion
The modification of the objective function as proposed in eq. (24) may pre-
vent strategic bidding through the manipulation of the submitted FT value, but
this modification also implies that strategic bidding through the bid parameters
of hourly bids becomes potentially possible.
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Regarding the principle of the phenomena, the examples presented in the
paper demonstrate that if a complex order brings large benefits for the objective
function, but it can be accepted only under certain circumstances (e.g. the MCP
must be higher than a given value, as in the examples above for c1), the solver
tends to drop other complex orders with less significant contribution to meet
these requirements.
If we consider the original objective function described in eq. (16), which
does not consider the production costs computed from the FT and VT values,
the minimum income conditions based on these values may raise issues.
On the other hand, if we neglect the contribution of hourly bids belonging
to complex orders, but we do consider the FT/VT-based costs in the objective
as in eq. (24), the bid acceptance constraints related to hourly bids can make
some dispatches impossible
One may raise the question if the inclusion of both the hourly bid-based com-
ponents and the FT/VT-based components in the objective function is possible.
Theoretically this can be done, however in this case the cost of these supply bids
will be considered twice in the objective, which will imply that standard supply
bids will be preferred compared to MIC bids during the clearing.
Let us furthermore note that the implicit assumption of perfect information
has been used through the paper. In realistic cases, the validity of this assump-
tion depends on the publicly available data of DAPXs. The general idea of the
paper may be used however also without perfect information. If an MIC order
submitted to a DAPX with low hourly bid price values is regularly accepted
(thus the contribution to the TSW is large), the bidder may try to increase the
submitted FT value in order to test, weather the order is able to ’push out’
other MIC bids from the dispatch and increase the resulting MCP.
5. Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have shown how the formalism of minimum income condi-
tion orders allows strategic bidding through the manipulation of various bid pa-
rameters and via the interplay of multiple MIC orders. In addition, we have also
shown that various modifications of the objective function used in the market
clearing (TSW) only partially resolve this issue. As these orders are widely used
in various DAPXs (mainly because they make the bidding process of generating
units easier), and according to the current result they may open possibilities for
strategic bidding, further research of the discussed topic is advised.
5.1. Future work
Irrespective of which formulation (eq. (4) or eq. (24) ) of the TSW is
used, it is possible that players provide false FT and VT values to the ISO.
As we have seen, the consequences of this depend on the other bids present
in the market and also on the clearing mechanism used, but in any case, such
decisions may create the potential of gaming. A possible approach could be to
fix these parameters during the registration of the users in the market, and allow
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their modification only relatively rarely. It is also theoretically possible to ask
the participants to define V T as a given (fixed) function of actual fuel prices.
However, the terms FT and V T also depend on the applied technology, thus
may change independently of the fuel cost, which makes the applicability of this
approach questionable. Further future studies, approaches and discussion are
required to grasp every aspect of this problem.
In addition, in this paper we assumed only one strategic player. As a follow-
up of this study, it is quite straightforward to ask, what happens if the partic-
ipant submitting the other MIC bid also behaves as a strategic player. On the
one hand, the resulting iterative game may be analyzed in this case, and on the
other hand, the existence and uniqueness of equilibria may be also subject to
future studies.
Additional studies are necessary to determine the practical implications of
the discussed theoretical results. The scale of these possible practical implica-
tions depends on the typical number and parameters of MIC orders submit-
ted to various markets. Further studies considering real market data (as in
(Madani and Van Vyve, 2014) in the case of block orders) can provide results
about the practical relevance of the results presented in this paper.
Furthermore, new approaches in the computational formulation of MIC or-
ders and market clearing algorithms may possibly alleviate undesired properties
and effects of MIC orders. In particular, innovative formulation of minimum
income condition orders, as described in (Madani and Van Vyve, 2018), where
the general class of so called ’MP bids’ covers the MIC orders as well, may be
free of the disadvantages discussed in this paper – this, however must be the
subject of future studies.
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Á. Sleisz, D. Divényi, B. Polgári, P. Sőrés, D. Raisz, Challenges in the formula-
tion of complex orders on european power exchanges, in: European Energy
Market (EEM), 2015 12th International Conference on the, IEEE, 2015, pp.
1–5.
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